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Abstract 
This study tests whether psychological attachment to a political party influences voluntary 
participation in a government-promoted public-good scheme, positing that cooperation is higher 
among households that identify with the party in government and lower among households that 
identify with the party in opposition. The focus is participation in a voluntary recycling scheme, in the 
context of a European country (Malta) where two parties dominate the political landscape. A 
nationally-representative survey (n = 1,037), yielded information on recycling participation rates and 
on environmental and political preferences. The survey was conducted shortly after a change in 
government and also gauged intent to participate in a new scheme with a split-sample manipulation in 
which the treatment group received a political prime. The results indicate that the initial uptake of the 
scheme launched by a Nationalist government was significantly lower among respondents close to the 
Labour Party. Five years later this effect had decayed. But intent to participate in the hypothetical 
scheme was lower among respondents close to the party in opposition (this time, the Nationalist 
Party), if primed with a cue that associates the new scheme with the Labour party. Formal modeling 
of scheme participation and intent (controlling for political and environmental ideology inter alia), 
yielded consistent results. These findings shed light on a new dimension which may be responsible for 
diverse rates of uptake of a public good schemes with practical implications for scheme promotion. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This study investigates the relationship between partisanship and the willingness of households 
to voluntarily contribute to public goods. More specifically, it examines whether closely 
identifying with a political party stimulates contribution to a government-promoted voluntary 
recycling scheme, if that party is in government, and dampens it, if that party is in opposition. 
The need to examine how partisanship effects behaviour (beyond voting) has been flagged in 
recent contributions (Gerber and Huber 2010; Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014; Sunstein 2014), 
and the question remains underexplored in recycling specifically, and public goods more 
generally.   
 
Although a handful of studies on pro-environmental behaviour do consider the roles of 
political vote, ideology or political interest (Torgler and García-Valiñas 2007; Costa and Kahn 
2013; Dupont and Bateman 2012; Coffey and Joseph 2013; McBeth, et al 2013; Briguglio, et 
al 2015, ), there appear to be none which parse out party identification as a distinct determinant 
of voluntary cooperation. Party identification is a form of psychological attachment to a party, 
often acquired quite early in life and typically manifesting itself in stable voting preferences, 
and which may strengthened by the screening out of threatening information (Marsh 2006). It 
is a type of social identity (Campbell, et al 1960; Lewis‐Beck, et al 2008), considered to be 
more stable and less cognitive than political interest or ideology (Campbell, et al 1960). The 
term “negative partisans” has been used to describe those who feel strongly against the party 
in government (Crewe 1976). The premise in this paper is that, aside from their ideological 
preferences, individuals may feel sufficiently attached to the party in government to derive 
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satisfaction from contributing to public goods promoted by that party, or attached enough to 
the party in opposition to act in defiance of government’s efforts.  
 
The study employs a rich data set drawn from a dedicated nationally-representative 
telephone survey (n = 1,037), carried out in a European context (Malta), where two dominant 
parties characterise the political landscape, and where a change in government had recently 
occurred. Data on recycling behaviour and intent, on scheme attributes, and on environmental 
and political preferences, made it possible to formally investigate the relationship between 
political attachment and participation, while controlling for other determinants. The survey also 
gauged intent to participate in a new scheme (under a new government) with a split-sample 
manipulation, in which the treatment group received a political prime, namely a piece of 
information which allowed them to infer an association between the scheme with the new 
government, without providing more detailed knowledge.1  Although priming experiments 
have gained momentum  (Lenz 2009; McDermott 2002), applications in the field of recycling 
are still limited (Croson and Treich 2014).  
 
 
2. Literature Review   
2.1 Household cooperation in public-good schemes   
 
                                                          
1 In this study, we refer to this treatment as a prime. We recognize that there are inconsistencies across 
disciplines in the use of the term “prime” versus “frame”, and that these terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably (See Druckman et al. 2009 for a discussion). 
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Within the broad literature on household cooperation in public-good schemes, recycling 
participation has drawn considerable scholarly attention. This not only reflects policy-makers’ 
concern with ever increasing volumes of household waste and its associated environmental 
impacts (Briguglio 2016; OECD 2008), but also the availability of rich data, capable of offering 
valuable lessons for other public-good domains (Kinnaman and Takeuchi 2014). Much like 
behaviour in other public-good domains, recycling requires households to utilise private 
resources, but its benefits (such as the diversion of waste from landfill and reduction of harmful 
emissions) are public, enjoyed collectively by all members of society (Briguglio 2016).   In 
scenarios like this, economic models built on the assumption of purely self-interested agents 
predict little voluntary contribution - such agents would opt to free-ride on the efforts of others 
(Baumol and Oates 1988). Intervention is therefore considered necessary to tip the cost-benefit 
trade-off to favour participation (Hahn 1989). In turn, much of the literature has focused on the 
role of fees to discourage mixed waste disposal (Fullerton, et al 2010) and, increasingly, of 
convenience to relieve the time and space required to separate waste (Jenkins, et al 2003; 
Sidique, et al 2010; Lange, et al 2014). 
  
In economic studies on waste, households are often modelled as constrained utility-
maximisers: Their members give up leisure-time and space to separate waste for recycling and 
weigh the cost of doing so against the benefits derived from participating. Recent work has 
given greater attention to the role of moral preferences that household members may hold, as 
drivers of participation. The process of cooperation in public-good schemes allows household 
members to fulfil moral preferences and generates a private so-called “warm-glow” benefit 
(Andreoni 1990), or suppresses the guilt of not cooperating (Brekke, et al 2003). A review of 
empirical studies concludes that such motives may indeed be important determinants 
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(Kinnaman 2006), large enough to stimulate voluntary recycling even if this involves private 
costs (Briguglio, et al 2015; Czajkowski, et al 2014; Abbott, et al 2013; Halvorsen 2008). 
Insights from environmental psychology further suggest that, underpinning such motives, are 
important priors like awareness of consequences, belief in the efficacy of action and ascription 
of responsibility (Schwartz 1977; Biel and Thøgersen 2007). Recycling participation is, in fact, 
generally found to increase with knowledge or awareness (Jenkins, et al 2003) and educational 
effort  (Sidique, et al 2010), although communication campaigns which fail to contribute to 
recycling effort are also documented (Valle, et al 2005).  
 
2.2 The role of political preferences and cues   
 
 In applied work, moral motives are often proxied by some measure of environmental 
attitude or behaviour (Viscusi, et al 2011; Halvorsen 2008; Abbott, et al 2013; Czajkowski, et 
al 2014; Brekke, et al 2003; Hage, et al 2009; Bruvoll and Nyborg 2004). Vote or political 
affiliation data have been used as proxies for environmental motives, but the results are mixed: 
Recycling is found to be higher among Green Party supporters in Sweden (Hage and 
Söderholm 2008) and among non-voters (possibly in protest against waste fees) in Norway 
(Halvorsen 2008). The vote variable has also often found to be an insignificant determinant 
(Brekke, et al 2010; Coffey and Joseph 2013; McBeth, et al 2013), but Brekke and his 
colleagues have argued that ignoring its effect could lead to exaggerated predictions of other 
moral effects (Brekke, et al 2010). The broader environmental economics literature reveals a 
relationship between political and environmental preferences, namely that ideologically left-
wing supporters tend to have stronger pro-environmental preferences  (Dupont and Bateman 
2012), being willing to pay higher financial contributions to environmental organisations 
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(Neumayer 2004), and demonstrating stronger support for environmental taxes (Torgler and 
García-Valiñas 2007). Higher political interest also correlates with stronger environmental 
concern (Torgler and García-Valiñas 2007; Wakefield, et al 2006).  
 
Political preferences can be activated by communication cues, yielding diverse 
cooperative outcomes. In a US-based study, the way recycling benefits were framed interacted 
with respondent ideology to influence intent to recycle (McBeth, et al 2013). Furthermore 
Democrats and Liberals recycled more than Conservatives and Republicans, but only if these 
showed strong interest in political news (Coffey and Joseph 2013). Diverse outcomes were 
again observed among Liberals and Conservatives, in response to an energy conservation 
nudge (Costa and Kahn 2013). In the US again, suitable framing of the Affordable Care Act 
(emphasizing the role of the private sector) narrows the partisan gap in uptake between 
Republicans and Democrats (Lerman et al 2017). Voting outcomes and promotional effort also 
significantly explained regional variation in the uptake of a voluntary recycling scheme in 
Malta (Briguglio, et al 2015).   
 
These findings chime with the literature from economic psychology which suggests 
that, in a world where decision-makers have limited capacities to assess all aspects, 
communication can make one dimension more salient than others, and influence decision 
outcomes, in different ways among different audiences (Glaeser 2014; Thaler and Sunstein 
2008; Tversky and Kahneman 1986). Hence, in determining cooperation in public-good 
schemes, there is scope not only for investigating the role of political preferences per se 
(Dupont and Bateman 2012), but also of how these interact with communication cues (Costa 
and Kahn 2013; Schultz, et al 2007; Bolsen, et al 2014; McBeth, et al 2013). Such 
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considerations may be particularly relevant at the time of initial rollout of a public-good 
scheme, for this is when public communication is most intense (Graber and Smith 2005; John 
2013) and when political cues are likely to be present. Though these may be ignored by some 
households, they may be picked up by those with strong political preferences (Graber and 
Smith 2005). Bolsen et al (2014) identify the kind of factors (such as explicit inducements to 
form an accurate opinion, and bipartisan support for the law) that can condition such partisan-
motivated reasoning (Bolsen, et al 2014).    
 
A question which remains unexplored is whether political attachment is a political 
preference worthy of examination. A number of theoretical insights converge to suggest so.  
Firstly, partisanship may shape perceptions about policy and provide a lens through which to 
assess decisions (Campbell, et al 1960). Whether as tendency to blindly follow the “tribe”, or 
as a reasonable act of taking of cues from a party that shares one’s interest (Lenz 2009), those 
who feel attached to the party promoting a scheme may be more receptive to it, relying on 
narratives from trusted political sources to simplify complex scientific information  (McBeth, 
et al 2013). By corollary, those who closely identify with the party in opposition may view the 
intervention (proposed by the government) with prejudice. This type of sentiment (among 
conservatives, of liberals), has been touted as an obstacle to climate regulation in the United 
States (Sunstein 2014). Secondly, as party identification is also linked with identification with 
fellow party supporters (Green, et al 2004), a sense of “togetherness”,  (Heyman and Ariely 
2004; Ahn, et al 2010), may also work in favour of participation when government, led by 
one’s own party, is promoting it. In contrast, the pleasure of spite may motivate those who 
identify strongly with the party in opposition (Abbink and Sadrieh 2009). Finally, simple self-
interest may be the mechanism that drives both cooperative and non-cooperative behavior 
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among partisans, in a bipolar political scenario, for cooperating with government, increases the 
chances of the incumbent winning the next election, and reduces the odds of the party in 
opposition. Such factional loyalty can be particularly tense around elections (Boissevain 1993).  
 
2.3 Synthesis and Hypotheses   
 
In synthesis then, the literature finds that recycling participation to be driven by warm-
glow benefits, and these benefits are typically considered to stem from the fulfilment of 
environmental preferences.  But it is also plausible that such benefits (and costs) derive from 
the fulfilment of political preferences and that such preferences can be activated by political 
cues.    The question which this study asks is precisely whether linking a public-good scheme 
to the party in government, creates diverse behavioural outcomes, depending on whether 
households are positively attached to the party in government to the party in opposition, or to 
no party in particular.   To this end, we set out to test three hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The uptake of a public-good scheme is positive in attachment to the 
party in government (for example, uptake of a scheme launched by the Nationalist Party is 
higher among households attached to the Nationalist party).     
 
Hypothesis 2: The uptake of a public-good scheme is negative in attachment to the 
party in opposition (for example, uptake of a scheme launched by the Nationalist Party is 
lower among households attached to the Labour party). 
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Hypothesis 3: Support for a scheme becomes more partisan, the stronger the links 
between the scheme and the party in government (for example during scheme promotion 
and in the presence of cues that link a scheme to the party). 
3. Context and Survey  
3.1 Context 
 
The role of political attachment is likely to be more strongly felt in contexts where preferences 
are polarised, where political parties have a strong presence in governance (Katz 1987), and 
where competition between parties is not based on (obvious) ideological differences (Marsh 
2006). Malta offers the perfect context in this regard: It reports one of the highest voter turnouts 
in the world, and politics are dominated by two parties with limited ideological distinctions: 
The centre-left Labour Party called “Partit Laburista” (Labour Party) and the centre-right 
Nationalist Party called “Partit Nazzjonalista” (Nationalist Party) (IDEA 2004; Lane 2009). 
Strong, stable party loyalties characterise politics in Malta and one party’s gain in votes is the 
other one's loss  (Briguglio 2009; Boissevain 1993). Both parties enjoy strong social networks, 
their own television and radio stations, newspapers, and clubs all over the country (Baldacchino 
2002). In March 2013, general election turnout was 93 per cent and 98 per cent of first-count 
votes went to one of these two parties (Department of Information 2013).  The election resulted 
in a change of government, from one led by the Nationalist Party to one led by the Labour 
Party.  The survey for this study was launched within two months of this election.  
 
Malta’s drive to stimulate household waste recycling followed accession to the EU in 
2004 (European Environment Agency 2013).  In May 2008, two months after the general 
  
10 
 
elections had reconfirmed the Nationalist Party in Government, the responsible Ministry had 
introduced, and promoted, a door-to-door recycling-waste collection scheme. The scheme 
would offer collection of dry recycling waste, at least once a week, in special grey bags. These 
could be purchased for a small fee, though some were provided for free. Households could also 
discard recycling waste in unmanned waste receptors in each locality. Mixed municipal waste 
collection continued to be offered door-to-door, almost daily, without quantity restrictions and 
free of charge. Despite the lack of incentive and the nuisance of separating and storing recycling 
waste, uptake was positive (Briguglio, et al 2015). It continued to increase when the scheme 
was delegated from the Ministry to Local Councils, and later to private operators (National 
Statistics Office Malta 2013).    
 
Figure 1 summarises the time line of events that contextualise the six month period 
during which data was gathered for this study. The survey, described next, sought to measure 
initial uptake of the scheme launched by the Nationalist government (as at 2008), participation 
rates at the time of the survey (2013) as well as intent to participate in a hypothetical new 
scheme to be launched by the Labour government.  
 
Figure 1 Time-line of events 
 
3.2 Sample generation 
 
Data for the study was drawn from a nationally-representative survey conducted by a 
team of trained enumerators. Computer Assisted Telephone Surveys were used to avoid biasing 
responses towards literate respondents and avid recyclers, a problem that is typical of self-
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administered surveys (Hage, et al 2009). A face-to-face mechanism would have limited sample 
size, given budgetary constraints. The sampling frame was generated from the Maltese 
electoral register.  
 
To ensure that households had an equal probability of being captured (no matter their 
size) household members were aggregated, then randomly sampled, with up to four 
replacements, from natural next-row choice (to cater for drop-outs). Telephone numbers were 
matched using on-line directories.  Interviews were then conducted with the household member 
answering the telephone, provided they confirmed that they were aged 18 years or over. A total 
of 1,037 responses were generated in this way. Figure 2 indicates that the regional distribution 
of these households was highly representative of that of the whole population of Maltese 
households (which totals 142,310). A comparison of the sampled household characteristics 
with those of national data (National Statistics Office 2012a) also indicates very similar 
characteristics (described in 3.5 below). Telephone respondents were, however, more likely to 
be female, which explains why the sample is female-skewed relative to the Maltese population.   
 
Figure 2 Distribution of households by region in sample, population 
 
 3.3 Survey instrument 
 
The interview itself was developed after an extensive review of recycling studies and 
following interviews with waste separation operators and regulators to identify the actual 
scheme attributes. Pan-European surveys (including the European Social Survey and 
Eurobarometer) were reviewed for comparable questions on politics and the Maltese Census 
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was used as a reference for wording on demographic questions. Following clearance by the 
Ethics Committee at the University of Stirling, a pen-and-paper pilot study was conducted in 
October 2012 (n = 100). The syntax was kept very simple, any unfamiliar terms were defined 
and scales were kept similar between questions, with ranges specifying exact frequencies 
(Tourangeau, et al 2000). The interview was professionally translated into the Maltese 
language and programmed into Qualtrics software to allow use of randomisation options and 
to reduce inputting error.  
 
The first set of questions yielded data on household characteristics and constraints, 
including household size, composition, dwelling type and locality. The second set of questions 
required respondents to describe the recycling scheme in operation in their locality (collection 
frequency, price, types of waste, information sources) as perceived by households (Valle, et al 
2005). In the third section, respondents were asked if their household separated waste for door-
to-door collection in recent weeks, usingthe wording: “In the past 4 weeks did your household 
take out recycling waste in grey (or green) bags for door to door collection?” This was 
followed by a question on respondent recall of household uptake of the scheme as at 2008. 
“Now think back to how long ago your household started using these recycling services. When 
did your household start using grey bags? These were introduced in 2008”. Respondents were 
also asked to estimate the weight of their weekly waste generated. The next set of questions 
gauged respondent agreement on a 0-10 Likert scale with statements, including“The waste that 
households separate is well managed by collectors” (to measure efficacy belief) and “I 
consider myself to be an environmentalist” (replicating Viscusi, et al 2011, to measure 
environmental motive); For political questions, the study employed Eurobarometer and 
European Value Surveys wording (GESIS 2008, European Commission 2012). For interest 
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respondents were asked“How interested would you say you are in politics? Would you say you 
(personally) are very interested, quite interested, not very interested or not interested at all?” 
Ideology was gauged by left-right political orientation which accords with several other more 
complex characterisations (Jost, et al 2009), and has been employed in recent economic studies 
(Torgler and García-Valiñas 2007): “In politics, people sometimes talk of left and right. On a 
scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means left and 10 means right, where would you place, on this 
scale, generally, your views?” To gauge psychological attachment (Marsh 2006), respondents 
were asked “Which of these political parties do you feel closer to or less distant from? Partit 
Nazzjonalista, Partit Laburista, Alternattiva Demokratika, Other, Don’t Know, Prefer Not to 
Answer; followed by “How close do you feel to this party, do you feel very close, somewhat 
close or not very close?”   
 
3.4 Experiment design  
 
While the survey generated data on actual participation, an embedded experiment was 
designed to examine intent to participate in a scheme and the effect of a political prime 
associating this with the new government. The study described a hypothetical recycling scheme 
and randomised respondents (equally) into one of two conditions. In the treatment condition, 
ahead of the description of the scheme, respondents were told “The Labour Party is now in 
government”. In the control condition respondents received no such statement. In both 
treatments, respondents were then told“Imagine that a new door-to-door waste collection 
system is introduced in the coming days. In this new system, recyclable waste like plastic, 
paper, cardboard and tin, would continue to be collected in the transparent grey bags. These 
would be distributed for free. But garbage would only be collected door-to-door if it is placed 
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in a special brown bag. The brown bags would cost 10 cents each.” The attributes of the 
scheme in the scenario were deliberately realistic, almost identical to the current scheme. No 
further information was given to respondents on the consequences of their decisions, to avoid 
confounding results (Boudreau and MacKenzie 2014). Respondents were then asked to 
consider intent to participate in a scheme that incentivises recycling: “In the 10 weeks that 
follow, would your household be (a) likely to do or (b) likely to not do the following: Dispose 
of household garbage somewhere else; choose products that generate less waste; compost 
organic waste at home; separate some waste for recycling; other”. Consideration of other 
waste management options were included in order to help respondents make more accurate 
predictions.   
 
3.5 The Sample   
 
As indicated in Figure 2, the sample was regionally representative. Sample respondents 
also report the same mean household size as the national population (2.9) and a gross income 
mean that was just slightly lower (€22,631) than the corresponding figure from the National 
Statistics Office (€25,800) (National Statistics Office 2012b).  Respondents estimated very 
similar amounts of daily kerb-side waste as recorded in national estimates (0.7 kilograms per 
person) (National Statistics Office Malta 2013). Although no national figures are available to 
identify the percentage of households that participated in the kerb-side scheme, indications 
from other studies suggest that as at 2011, at least half of Maltese households were recycling 
regularly, and several more less regularly  (Bezzina and Dimech 2011). Two years later, this 
study indicates that three-quarters of all households were participating to some degree or other 
in kerb-side recycling. Sampled household recycling rates stood on average at some 23 per 
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cent, well within the total potential kerb-side recovery, estimated at 33 per cent (National 
Statistics Office Malta 2013).  The percentage of respondents stating they voted Labour in the 
sample stood at 54, which corresponds to the percentage in the 2013 elections (Department of 
Information 2013).  The data set also reveals that approximately half of the respondents stated 
that “felt close” to one of the two main parties. Analysis of cross-tabulations reveals expected 
correlations between voting outcomes and political attachment. In contrast with population at 
large, partisans are generally more likely to reside in the Northern regions of Malta 
(Nationalist) and in the South (Labour), and are less likely to hold tertiary education.  
4. Analysis 
4.1 Hypotheses  
 
This data-set makes it possible to empirically test whether the likelihood of 
participation (actual and intended) in a government-promoted recycling scheme is higher 
among households with strong positive attachment towards the party in government and lower 
among households with strong positive attachment to the party in opposition.  
 
More specifically, we set out to test whether uptake of a public-good scheme is positive 
in attachment to the party in government (Hypothesis 1). We do this by testing H1a: Uptake of 
a scheme launched by the Nationalist Party is higher among households attached to the 
Nationalist party; and  H1b: Intent to take up a hypothetical scheme launched by the Labour 
Party is higher among households attached to the Labour party. We also test whether uptake of 
a public-good scheme is negative in attachment to the party in opposition (Hypothesis 2). We 
do this by testing H2a: Uptake of a scheme launched by the Nationalist Party is lower among 
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households attached to the Labour party; and H2b: Intent to take up a hypothetical scheme 
launched by the Labour Party is lower among households attached to the Nationalist party. 
Finally, we examine whether the effect of political attachment is positive in links associating 
the scheme with the party in government (Hypothesis 3). We do this by testing: H3a. The effect 
of political attachment on uptake intent is stronger when respondents are primed with a political 
statement; and H3b: The effect of political attachment decays with distance from scheme 
promotion.  To test each of these hypotheses we start by examining simple differences in 
means.   
 
4.2 Analysis of differences in means 
As can be seen in Figure 3, the data reveals that mean recycling participation doubled 
between the first year (Mean = 0.413, S.D. = 0.493) and the end of the fifth (Mean = 0.772, 
S.D. = 0.420). Intent to recycle in the new scheme (that incentivises recycling) was almost 
unanimous (Mean = 0.938, S.D. = 0.242). The averages also reveal that initial uptake was 
significantly lower (p = 0.032) among households closer to the Labour Party (Mean = 0.324, 
S.D. = 0.469), in the first year of roll-out of the scheme, in contrast with households that 
considered themselves closer to the Nationalist party (Mean = 0.427, S.D. = 0.496). By the fifth 
year of operation of the scheme, there was no significant difference in means. Nor was there 
any difference in intent.  
 
To test Hypothesis 1, we first look at the mean rates of uptake of the scheme launched 
under a Nationalist government by Nationalist-attached households compared to the mean 
household. We then look at the mean uptake of a (hypothetical) scheme under a Labour 
government by Labour-attached households and compare this to the mean. In neither case do 
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we find any significant differences: Those who signalled feeling “closer to” the Nationalist 
party (Mean = 0.427, S.D. = 0.496) were no more likely (p = 0.330) to have taken up recycling 
than others (Mean = 0.408, S.D. = 0.492) in the first year of the (Nationalist government) 
scheme. Likewise, in the case of a hypothetical scheme launched under a newly elected Labour 
Party, those stating they were “closer to” Labour (Mean = 0.924, S.D. = 0.266), were not more 
likely than others  (Mean = 0.943, S.D. = 0.234), to take up the scheme (p = 0.848). On the 
basis of this, we conclude that, contrary to our first hypothesis, attachment to the party in 
government does not seem to create a significant positive pressure on cooperation in a 
government promoted scheme.   
 
To test Hypothesis 2, we examine the uptake rates of the scheme launched under a 
Nationalist government by Labour-attached households as well as rates of uptake of a new 
scheme under a Labour government by households attached to the Nationalist party. We find 
evidence that attachment to the party in opposition may suppress cooperation: In the first year 
of the scheme’s launch there was a significantly lower (P < 0.001) uptake among those who 
stated they were “closer to” Labour (Mean = 0.324, S.D. = 0.469) as opposed to others (Mean 
= 0.447, S.D. = 0.486). On this basis we do not reject H2a.  However in examining the 
difference in mean intent to participate in the new hypothetical scheme under a Labour 
government, we find no significant difference (p = 0.399) in intent between those “closer to” 
the Nationalist party (Mean = 0.933, S.D. = 0.252) and others (Mean = 0.938, S.D. = 0.241). 
We conclude that uptake of a public-good scheme may be is negative in attachment to the party 
in opposition. 
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To test Hypothesis 3, we exploit the randomisation of the prime/no-prime treatment 
with a political cue that associates the public-good scheme with the Labour party.  We find that 
administering a prime among the Labour attached (“closer to”, “very close to” or “voted for” 
Labour) creates no significant increase in mean uptake (Primed Mean = 0.917, S.D. = 0.276), 
(Unprimed Mean = 0.931, S.D. = 0.255), (p = 0.663).2  But among those “closer to” the 
Nationalist party, administering a prime significantly (P = 0.021) suppresses uptake (Primed 
Mean = 0.897, S.D. = 0.306; Unprimed Mean = 0.974, S.D. = 0.160), as depicted in Figure 4. 
It appears then, that the prime does create an effect, but only in the negative direction, among 
those close to the party in opposition. Furthermore, there is no evidence that households 
intended to stop recycling: What the prime seems to do is to suppress intent to start.  Turning 
to H3b, it seems clear from Figure 3 that distinctions based on partisan attachment are no longer 
present five years after the initial promotion of the scheme. Indeed, in contrast with what was 
observed in Year 1, those close the Labour party (Mean = 0.763, S.D. = 0.426), were no less 
likely (p = 0.325) than others (Mean = 0.777, S.D. = 0.417) to be recycling later in the scheme’s 
life. On the basis of these results, we do not reject Hypothesis 3.  
 
Figure 3 Recycling participation among politically attached, all households 
Figure 4 Effect of a prime on recycling intent among politically attached, all households 
 
4.3 Formal analysis 
                                                          
2 We cannot exclude that the possibility that the absence of a positive effect of the prime may be due to the very 
high levels of intent signaled among both the primed and unprimed Labour voters, leaving little room for 
significant differences to be registered.    
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In order to test whether these findings survive ceteris paribus conditions, we now set 
about a more formal analysis of the role of political attachment. Drawing upon the conceptual 
framework outlined in Section 2, and following others in the field (e.g. Briguglio et. al 2015, 
Callan and Thomas 1997, Hage and Soderholm 2008) we specify the likelihood of participation 
in a recycling scheme as a function of household constraints, scheme attributes, environmental 
preferences and demographic controls. We add partisan preferences, whose effect we are 
interested in testing, as per Model 1:  
 
Yi = α + β1Gi + β2Ci + β3Ei + β5Di + β5Pi + ui     Model 1 
 
Where 
i indexes households;  
Yi is the likelihood of waste separation by household i;  
Gi is a vector of scheme attributes enjoyed by household i  
Ci is a vector of constraints faced by household i, including income, time and space;  
Ei is a vector describing household i’s pro-environmental and ideological preferences;  
Di is a vector of demographic controls 
Pi is a vector describing household i’s partisan preferences 
ui represents the error term.  
 
Within this framework, and in line with the findings of the literature, we expect the 
chances of observing recycling (Y) to be lower among households with higher constraints (C), 
higher among those with pro-environmental preferences (E) and higher among those enjoying 
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favourable scheme attributes (G). The main test of interest is whether the likelihood of uptake 
(Y) is higher among households with strong positive attachment towards the party in 
government, and lower among households with strong positive attachment to the party in 
opposition, even after controlling for ideology and political interest.  In estimating the model 
with intent to participate as the outcome variable, we include recycling experience as an 
important control variable (Knussen and Yule 2008). Here we are also able to test how a 
political prime interacts with partisan preferences, anticipating higher intent among primed 
households with strong positive attachment towards the party in government and lower intent 
among primed households with strong positive attachment to the party in opposition.   
 
Table 1 Determinants of recycling participation, Survey data  
 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the analysis. The 
intervention vector (G) is represented by the variables COLLECT-REC, COLLECT-MIX, 
FREE-BAGS and INFO-TYPES, measuring perceived frequency of collection of recycling and 
mixed waste per week, availability of free recycling bags, and the number of information 
sources which the household uses (Council, Government, Operator). The variable USES-SITE 
captures the extent to which the household uses alternative recycling disposal facilities, which 
theoretically could compete with participation in the kerb-side scheme  (Beatty, et al 2007). 
The vector of household constraints (C) is represented by the variables SPACE, SINGLE and 
WASTE, the first indicating whether the residence has a garden or not, the second identifying 
households with only one resident (as a measure of adult time available for recycling), the third 
indicating kilograms of waste generated as estimated by the survey respondent, which we 
consider exogenous. Pro-environmental sentiment (E) is captured by two variables PRO-ENV 
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and EFFICACY, both on a 0 to 10 scale, indicating the respondents’ agreement with the 
relevant statements. Other control variables include FEMALE, AGE and EDUC which capture 
the respondent’s gender, age and educational levels respectively. YEARS is a control variable, 
useful in analysis of intent and measuring years of recycling to date. 
  
The main variables of interest, ATTACH-PN and ATTACH-PL, measure attachment 
where respondents stating they feel “closer” to the Nationalist Party and the Labour Party are 
coded as (1) respectively and (0) otherwise. For use in the intent analysis, the variable PRIME 
represents a simple binary variable of whether or not the respondent received a prime, and the 
variables P* represent the interaction of the prime with the attachment variables.  At the risk 
of over-specification, but with a view to parsing out the pure effects of attachment, the variables 
INTEREST and IDEOLOGY control for political interest and political ideology respectively, 
the former on a four-point scale, the latter on a 10-point scale, while the variables VOTE 
capture voting outcomes. The dependent variable is represented by UPTAKE, 
PARTICIPATES, and INTENT, indicating respectively whether households took up 
participation in the kerb-side scheme in 2008 and by 2013 and whether they intended to 
participate in the new scheme.     
 
Table 2 Determinants of recycling uptake 
 
Table 2 reports the determinants of uptake at the start of the scheme introduced and 
promoted by Nationalist government, (UPTAKE) as the dependent variable. Given that the 
dependent variables are binary, and that Ordinary Least Squares estimation can run into the 
problem of generating predictions that are not bound between zero and one, we employ a Probit 
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link function to estimate the models for uptake and participation. Here, the inverse standard 
normal distribution of the probability (of uptake) is modelled as a linear combination of the 
predictors. In Table 2 we report the marginal effects, that is the increase in probability attributed 
to a one-unit increase in each of the predictors for an average individual (dy/dx). The table also 
includes the standard errors of the individual coefficients, and the main fit-statistics.  
 
Ahead of interpreting the results, it bears emphasis here that the predicted variable in 
Table 2 is one that is based on recall. Furthermore several of the explanatory variables are 
essentially proxies. Indeed we employ the 2013 data for preferences and constraints, relying 
on the assumption that these provide an adequate proxy of those in 2008. Both 2008 and 2013 
were election years and political ideology and attachment tend to be stable preferences. We 
also include variables that describe scheme attributes in 2013, in place of those which may 
have been present in 2008, while exerting due caution in interpretation - essentially we include 
these variables as control variables with a view to capturing some of the variation that 
characterized the initial scheme attributes.   
 
We first estimate a simple model (Model a) without political determinants. As expected, 
we find that the availability of physical space in a household positively contributed to uptake, 
as did pro-environmental attitudes and education levels. Females also had a stronger tendency 
to report uptake in 2008. Single person households tended to report lower 2008 uptake, as 
theoretically anticipated, as did the use of alternative recycling schemes. We find that scheme 
attributes (proxied by those in 2013) provide little explanatory power, other than a negative 
coefficient on the variable describing information sources - suggesting that the more varied the 
sources of information (as at 2013), the lower the uptake at 2008.  
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We then proceed to include the VOTE variable (Model b). We find that households 
which voted Labour (in 2013) were less likely to be recycling at the scheme’s launch in 2008 
(testing the model with 2008 recalled vote returns the same result, albeit with a smaller sample 
size). Because VOTE captures many dimensions which may not always operate in the same 
direction, we then replace VOTE by separate variables capturing political interest, ideology 
and attachment, in order to see which dimension of voting outcome may be responsible for 
driving these results (Model c). We find that neither political interest nor ideology (both 
proxied by 2013 values) help explain 2008 uptake. Rather, it is political attachment (and only 
that towards the Labour party) which constitutes a significant (and negative) determinant. The 
computed marginal effects suggest that when respondents admitted to being “Closer to” to the 
Labour party, the probability of uptake of the scheme was reduced by 7 percent, even after 
controlling for other drivers (including environmental morality) and constraints. But being 
closer to the nationalist party does not constitute a significant determinant. The results 
remained stable when the model was estimated using LOGIT, REG and VCE (ROBUST) 
commands.3    
 
Table 3 Determinants of recycling participation 
 
In Table 3, the same process is repeated, this time with eventual participation 
(PARTICIPATES) in an established scheme as the depenedent variable. Once again, the first 
                                                          
3 We also estimate a model with years of participation in the kerbside scheme as the dependent variable. We 
again confirm that being close to the Labour Party delays uptake of a scheme run under a Nationalist 
government. The coefficient here is 0.522 (significant at the 5 % level) suggesting that attachment to the Labour 
Party creates a 6 month delay, ceteris paribus. 
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model (Model a) is estimated without political determinants. The results again confirm 
theoretical expectations: Households are more likely to recycle when their members hold 
higher environmental moral motives and efficacy beliefs. Households are less likely to recycle 
when they face constraints like limited space, few members and limited waste, and they are 
more likely to participate when scheme attributes, (including frequency of collection and free 
bags) make it easier to do so. As expected, the use of competing schemes reduces the chances 
of taking up kerb-side recycling. We then add political variables, starting with the variable 
VOTE (Model b), which provides no additional explanatory power. We replace this variable 
by INTEREST, IDEOLOGY and ATTACH to capture the possible role of the distinct political 
preferences in the full model (Model c). We find that distinctions in political (left/right) 
ideology do not add any additional explanatory power, and neither do distinctions in political 
attachment. These findings confirm the results of the simple analysis of means. We also 
observe, a greater chance of recycling participation among households where the respondent 
holds stronger political interest.   
 
Table 4 Determinants of recycling intent 
 
Finally, Table 4 summarises the determinants of participation intent (INTENT) in a 
hypothetical recycling scheme, employing the data generated by the embedded experiment. It 
is worth recalling, at this stage, that the scheme is identical to the current scheme in every way, 
except that the scheme incentivises recycling by having residents pay a nominal fee to dispose 
of remaining (unseparated) waste. Few respondents admitted to having no intent to participate 
in this scheme, limiting the variation in the dependent variable. Nonetheless, we start by 
estimating INTENT to participate in a hypothetical scheme as a simple function of years of 
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participation in the current scheme, on the premise that hypothetical kerbside recycling scheme 
is determined by experience in recycling (Knussen and Yule 2008). We control only for the 
difference in attributes between the current and the new scheme (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee 
1997) as well as basic respondent demographics (Model a). We note that both experience with 
recycling and the provision of free recycling bags in the current scheme positively effect intent 
to participate in a scheme where recycling will effectively be subsidised. We then include 
VOTE as an explanatory variable, but find that this adds no predictive power (Model b). We 
proceed to replace VOTE by incorporating IDEOLOGY, INTEREST and ATTACHMENT 
(Model c), and find, again, no further explanatory power on the intent to participate in the 
scheme. Next, we control for the effect of the prime and its interaction with political 
attachment. Model d is fitted with STATA’s regress command, given that the estimation of the 
magnitude, sign and statistical significance of interaction effects in nonlinear models is 
problematic (Ai and Norton 2003).4 Now find that being politically-attached to the Nationalist 
Party and being reminded that the Labour Party is in government may suppresses intent to 
participate. Once again, however, it is, if anything, those who declare themselves to be close to 
the party in opposition whose intent is influenced (negatively), and not those who declare 
themselves closer to the party in government.   
 
By way of summary, the results show that attachment to the Labour Party in opposition, 
was a significant, negative determinant of initial uptake of the Nationalist government scheme. 
There is also evidence that attachment with the Nationalist party in opposition interacts with a 
                                                          
4 A comparison of the outcomes with a Probit estimation corrected for the magnitude of interaction effect using the “inteff” 
command (Norton, et al 2004), shows consistent results: the interaction of the prime with attachment to the party in 
opposition suppressed uptake. 
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partisan cue to suppress intent to participate in a hypothetical scheme under a Labour 
government. Neither attachment to the Nationalist Party nor attachment to the Labour Party 
were significant determinants of eventual participation in an established scheme. Reverting 
back to the original hypotheses, we can, once again, safely reject Hypothesis 1: Uptake at the 
launch of a government promoted scheme uptake is no higher among households attached to 
the party in government, whether in the context of an actual scheme (H1a) or of a hypothetical 
scheme (H1b). Once again, we do not reject Hypothesis 2: Uptake is lower among households 
attached to the party in opposition in the context of an actual scheme launched by the 
Nationalist Party (H2a) and in the context of a hypothetical scheme launched by the Labour 
party (H2b). We again confirm that the effect of partisan attachment on intent is significant 
only in the presence of a partisan cue in the scheme’s promotion and only among negative 
partisans (H3a). Moreover, the effect of partisan attachment decays over time and other 
determinants gain importance (H3b).   
4.4 Discussion  
 
A review of the main shortcomings of this study, and of the efforts made to mitigate them, will 
draw attention to the importance of further academic scrutiny on the question of the role of 
political attachment in determining uptake of public-good schemes. Although direct 
observation of household recycling is difficult and may influence behaviour itself  (Brekke, et 
al 2010), an obvious concern with research such as this, is the reliance on self-reported 
behaviour which can be biased towards higher recycling reports. The use of telephone 
interviews (as opposed to self-administered postal/web surveys) addressed some concern with 
selection bias. The insertion of face-saving questions, appeals to honesty, assurance of 
confidentially and anonymity (enumerators themselves did not know whom they were calling), 
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and invitations to report behaviour in specific periods, were all intended to eliminate strategic 
responses. The resulting data were both internally consistent and closely comparable with 
national data.   
 
A specific shortcoming of the data on initial uptake, was reliance on recall. In this 
regard, the results of the formal analysis of uptake (Table 2) merit particular caution, even if 
they do replicate those from a study which employed administrative data in the same context 
(Briguglio, et al 2015).  A similar issue lay in relying on stated intent for future uptake, which 
implicitly rests on the assumption that intent is an antecedent to behaviour (Ajzen 1991), or at 
least, that the intent-behaviour bias is evenly spread. Lack of sincerity, poor forecasting  
(Tourangeau, et al 2000) and lack of control over other household members (Boldero 1995) 
could introduce unobserved heterogeneity among the respondents. To mitigate other errors, 
and in line with best practice, respondents were given the opportunity to reflect not only upon 
their current behaviour but also on other waste disposal options before being asked to consider 
future recycling behaviour (Arrow, et al 1993). They were offered a realistic scenario with a 
significant likelihood of being implemented (Poe and Vossler 2011), and were, reasonably, 
asked to predict their behaviour over the coming weeks. It was also fortunate, that in most 
instances, respondents stated that they were the household member responsible for waste.  
Future research that observes (rather that relies on recall or intent) the same individuals over 
time would mitigate some of these shortcomings.  
 
In the experimental component, we took care to meet the criteria for sound design and 
analysis (Gaines, et al 2007). We employed a very simple treatment in stripped-down settings 
with no deception and no cash reward (McDermott 2002). A legitimate question is whether the 
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prime represented the kind of cue respondents may receive in real-life scenarios, or whether 
this was a relatively stronger stimulus, given that survey respondents are a captive audience 
(Luskin, et al 2002; Druckman and Nelson 2003). To mitigate this, the prime administered was 
very subtle and only implicitly politicised the scheme. It was free of the political posturing and 
repetition, which may occur in real life. Indeed, if anything, real-life stimuli could be stronger. 
Another oft-made consideration is whether the prime induces respondent learning (Lenz 2009). 
This is hardly likely to have been the case, given that the prime only mentioned that the Labour 
party was in government. With a 93 per cent voting turnout in the election held a few months 
earlier, it is unlikely that any of the respondents did not already know that. In fact, one problem 
with the treatment is that have been that the perception of the control (un-primed) group may 
not have been sufficiently different from that of the primed group. Together, these 
considerations suggest that the results in the intent scenario may actually be lower-bound 
estimates. Future research that tests the effects on cooperation of administering stronger cues 
on partisan preferences could develop these findings further. 
 
Other issues with the formal estimation methods are common to the techniques 
employed, but bear mention for the sake of completeness. In specifying a formal model, there 
is a risk of omitted variables, which can result in biased variable coefficients or errors. The 
specification of the models employed here, based on a conceptual framework of utility 
maximisation under constraints, included variables typically employed in recycling models 
within the limitations posed by over-specification. In fitting the models with a standard probit 
model, we also assumed homoskedasticity of the errors in the latent-variable model. To address 
possible problems with this assumption we also compute robust standard errors and re-
estimated the models using Logit and Ordinary Least Squares techniques. The results survived 
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these tests. The fact that the results on the other, more established determinants of recycling 
cooperation (namely household constraints, enabling scheme attributes and pro-envrionmental 
motives) support those in the environmental economics literature (Briguglio 2016), lends 
greater confidence to the more novel findings of our study, namely those pertaining to 
partisanship.    
5. Conclusion 
 
The findings in this study contribute new theoretical insights on the question that the 
study set out to examine, namely, whether political attachment is a significant determinant of 
participation in public-good scheme. Attachment to the party in opposition emerges as having 
a significant and negative influence on likelihood of participation in a government scheme, 
responding to cues that associate the scheme with the party in government. Such association 
does not seem enhance uptake among those who are attached to the party in government, and 
decays over time. This asymmetry reflects that which is observed when political ideology 
interacts with framing (McBeth, et al 2013; Costa and Kahn 2013), or with news interest 
(Coffey and Joseph 2013), and when vote interacts with promotional effort (Briguglio, et al 
2015).   
 
In some ways the results are unsurprising, echoing the observed phenomenon that the 
way economic performance is perceived, depends on voters’ partisan allegiance and the party 
in power (Schwartz 2017), and reflecting conventional wisdom that favorability towards a 
policy becomes more partisan the stronger its link with a particular party. Yet these findings 
provide some direct evidence that partisan allegiance can actually affect participation in a 
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public programme.  Indeed, the findings offer an important insight for promoting such public-
good schemes, in order to avoid creating unnecessary barriers. Strength of (negative) feeling 
towards politicians occurs well beyond the shores of Malta (Bartle and Bellucci 2009), not only 
in other, strongly bi-polar, two-party political systems (like the United Kingdom, USA, and 
Spain) but also in polarised multi-party or cadre party systems. In such contexts, governments 
wishing to encourage voluntary cooperation would do well to avoid partisan messages, or 
messengers, when promoting a scheme. Delaying political point-scoring to a later point (once 
the scheme is taken up) could be one way to of limiting harmful impacts.  
 
Voluntary contribution in public-good schemes is a phenomenon that is attracting 
increasing interest in economic literature (Guttman and Goette 2015, Guttman 2013), 
particularly given the (political, legislative and administrative) constraints of employing 
financial dis/incentives (Briguglio 2016). The findings of this study shed light on a determinant 
of voluntary cooperation which is quite distinct from other motives discussed in the literature 
to date. Moreover, if partisanship can influence household behaviour in a domain like the 
separation of waste at home, then there is scope to examine whether it also happens in other 
public-good domains.  
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Table 1: Determinants of recycling participation (Survey data)  
 
Variable N Mean S.D. Label 
 
Participation (Y) 
PARTICIPATES 987 0.772 0.420 Household Recycles at Kerb, Year 5 (0-1) 
UPTAKE 965 0.413 0.493 Household Recycled at Kerb, Year 1 (0-1) 
INTENT 946 0.938 0.242 Intent to Separate Waste (0-1) 
Perceived Scheme Attributes (G) 
COLLECT-REC 942 1.361 0.571 Recycling Collection Frequency (0-6) 
COLLECT-MXD 960 5.156 1.009 Garbage Collection Frequency (0-7) 
FREE-BAGS 988 0.370 0.483 Free Bag Distribution (0-1) 
INFO-TYPES 989 1.278 0.819 Number of Information Sources (0-3) 
USES-SITE 989 0.832 1.346 Uses Bring-in sites for Disposal (0-5) 
Household Constraints (C) 
SPACE 989 0.378 0.485 Household has a Garden (0-1) 
SINGLE 987 0.124 0.329 One Person Household (0-1) 
WASTE 899 14.913 15.43 Estimated Total Kerb Waste Generated  
Environmental Preferences (E) 
EFFICACY 985 8.257 2.218 Efficacy Belief (0-10) 
PRO-ENV 984 6.456 2.845 Considers Self Environmentalist (0-10) 
Demographic Controls (D) 
FEMALE 983 0.740 0.439 Respondent is Female (0-1) 
AGE 979 53.402 15.87 Respondent Age (18-90) 
EDUC 971 3.231 1.023 Respondent Level of Education (1-5) 
Political Preferences (P) 
INTEREST 982 2.257 0.948 Political Interest (1-4) 
IDEOLOGY 980 5.401 1.313 Political Ideology, Left Right (1-10) 
PRIME 989 0.5 0.5 Treated with Prime 
ATTACH-PN 975 0.171 0.377 Attached to Nationalist Party (0-1) 
ATTACH-PL 975 0.290 0.454 Attached to Labour Party (0-1) 
VOTE PN 975 0.144 0.351 Reported Voting PN in 2013 
VOTE PL 975 0.275 0.447 Reported Voting PL in 2013 
Other Controls 
YEARS 965 3.482 2.560 Years participating in Kerb- Scheme (0-6) 
YEARS-SITE 973 2.875 4.432  Years recycling at Site (0-12) 
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Table 2: Determinants of initial recycling uptake  
 MODEL  a.Basic Df/dx b.Vote Df/dx c.Attach Df/dx 
  S.E. S.E. S.E. 
 
COLLECT-REC 0.033 
 
0.032 0.035 
  -0.031 -0.031 -0.031 
COLLECT-MXD 0.016 0.019 0.017 
  -0.018 -0.018 -0.018 
FREE-BAGS -0.058* -0.055 -0.048 
  -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 
INFO-TYPES -0.055*** -0.050** -0.051** 
  -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 
USES-SITE -0.042*** -0.036*** -0.037*** 
  -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
SPACE 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.117*** 
  -0.034 -0.034 -0.034 
SINGLE -0.067 -0.072 -0.087* 
  -0.052 -0.052 -0.052 
WASTE 0 0 0 
  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
EFFICACY 0.012 0.01 0.011 
  -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
PRO-ENV 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 
  -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
FEMALE 0.069* 0.068* 0.055 
  -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 
AGE 0 0 0 
  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
EDUC 0.048** 0.040** 0.038* 
  -0.019 -0.02 -0.02 
VOTEPN   -0.069   
    -0.047   
VOTEPL   -0.093**   
    -0.038   
INTEREST     -0.012 
      -0.019 
IDEOLOGY     0.007 
      -0.012 
ATTACH-PN     -0.022 
      -0.044 
ATTACH-PL     -0.070* 
      -0.04 
 N 827 823 821 
Log-Lik Intercept Only: -561.833 588.66 -556.906 
Log-Lik Full Model: -493.084 -487.211 -482.922 
McFadden's Adj R2: 0.09 0.092 0.09 
Count R2: 0.666 0.677 0.687 
AIC*n: 1022.168 1014.421 1013.843 
BIC: -50.166 -42.216 -33.89 
 
 
Note: Models are estimated using a probit link function with recycling (2008) as dependent variable; Standard errors of the 
individual coefficients in italics;*** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% level. All models report p<0.000 
for the LR test.  
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Table 3:  Determinants of recycling participation 
 
MODEL  
  
a.Basic Df/dx 
S.E. 
b.Vote Df/dx 
S.E. 
c.Attach Df/dx 
S.E. 
 
COLLECT-REC 0.055** 0.054** 0.053** 
  -0.023 -0.023 -0.023 
COLLECT-MXD 0.019 0.019 0.018 
  -0.013 -0.013 -0.013 
FREE-BAGS 0.124*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 
  -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
INFO-TYPES -0.015 -0.016 -0.013 
  -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
USES-SITE -0.025*** -0.024*** -0.028*** 
  -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
SPACE 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.114*** 
  -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
SINGLE -0.101*** -0.104*** -0.099*** 
  -0.038 -0.038 -0.038 
WASTE 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
EFFICACY 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
  -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 
PRO-ENV 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 
  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
FEMALE 0.04 0.045 0.046 
  -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 
AGE 0.000 0.000 -0.001 
  -0.001 -0.001-- -0.001 
EDUC 0.044*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 
  -0.016 -0.016 -0.016 
VOTEPN   -0.02   
    -0.038   
VOTEPL   0.017   
    -0.03   
INTEREST     0.035** 
      -0.015 
IDEOLOGY     0.001 
      -0.01 
ATTACH-PN     -0.049 
      -0.038 
ATTACH-PL     -0.01 
      -0.032 
 N 840 836 838 
Log-Lik Intercept Only: -432.517 -430.25 -432.043 
Log-Lik Full Model: -353.563 -351.444 -349.244 
McFadden's Adj R2: 0.143 0.137 0.141 
Count R2: 0.814 0.818 0.81 
AIC*n: 741.127 742.887 742.487 
BIC: -70.373 -56.683 -51.17 
Note: Models are estimated using a probit link function with recycling participation (2013) as the dependent variable; 
Standard errors of the individual coefficients in italics, *** indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% level; All 
models report p<0.000 for the LR test. 
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Table 4: Determinants of recycling intent  
 
MODEL 
a.Basic Df/dx 
S.E. 
b.Vote Df/dx 
S.E. 
c.Attach Df/dx 
S.E. 
d.Prime Df/dx 
S.E. 
 
FREE-BAGS 0.043*** 0.455*** 0.042*** 0.059*** 
 -0.014 -0.17 -0.015 -0.016 
FEMALE 0.018 0.182 0.02  
 -0.018 -0.166 -0.019  
AGE 0 -0.004 0  
 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001  
EDUC 0.019** 0.196** 0.020** 0.024*** 
  -0.009 -0.09 -0.009 -0.008 
YEARS KERB  0.017*** 0.166*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 
 -0.003 -0.03 -0.003 -0.003 
INTEREST   -0.006 -0.006 
   -0.009 -0.009 
IDEOLOGY   -0.009 -0.010* 
   -0.006 -0.006 
ATTACH-PN   0.004 0.041 
   -0.021 -0.031 
ATTACH-PL   0.002 0.003 
    -0.018 -0.026 
PRIME     0 
     -0.021 
PRIME*PN    -0.079* 
     -0.042 
PRIME*PL    -0.007 
    -0.035 
VOTEPN  -0.166   
  -0.204   
VOTEPL  0.013   
  -0.171   
N 912 905 902 905 
R-squared    0.081 
Log-Lik Intercept Only -205 -204.6 -204.39  
Log-Lik Full Model: -173.146 -172.45 -171.382  
McFadden's R2: 0.155 0.157 0.162  
McFadden's Adj R2: 0.116 0.098 0.093  
Max-Likelihood R2: 0.067 0.068 0.071  
Count R2: 0.941 0.94 0.94  
AIC*n: 362.292 368.91 370.76  
BIC': 
-29.646 -16.59 
4.78 
  
Note: Models a, b, c are estimated using a probit link function with recycling intent as the dependent variable; Model d is 
fitted with STATA’s regress command. Standard errors of the individual coefficients in italics; All models report p<0.000 for 
the LR test.  
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